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Utah Leads the Way in Regulating Land Use Exactions
through Statute but Still Has Room to Improve
I. INTRODUCTION
Land use exactions law is an important area of law because it affects
a great deal of people. When a person or entity decides to develop a
piece of land, the local jurisdiction in which the property is located may
impose certain requirements on the developer. Often, the jurisdiction will
require an exaction. This means a local body conditions that a developer
give up land or pay some type of fee, such as an impact fee, water or
sewage connection fee, or fee-in-lieu of dedication, to obtain a building
permit.1 Current property owners who later want to expand their
premises may also find a building permit conditioned upon an exaction.2
Local government must be careful, however, that imposition of an
exaction does not amount to a taking. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
constitutional taking as “[t]he government’s actual or effective
acquisition of private property either by ousting the owner and claiming
title or by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility” and
states that a taking occurs when a “government action indirectly
interferes with or substantially disturbs the owner’s use and enjoyment of
the property.”3 Moreover, exactions law can indirectly affect people as
well. Costs of lots or houses in a new development will likely reflect
costs imposed on a developer through an exaction.4
The Supreme Court recently outlined tests for local jurisdictions
imposing land use exactions in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission5 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.6 In Nollan, the California
Coastal Commission tried to exact some of the Nollans private
beachfront property for use as a public easement in exchange for
granting the Nollans a building permit to rebuild a dwelling on their

1. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3d 1161, 1169 (Utah 2006).
2. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1493 (8th ed. 2004).
4. 9 MICHAEL J. DAVIS ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 85.12(e) (David A.
Thomas ed., Lexis 1999) (“[Developers] would like a chance to pass the fee . . . forward to
homebuyers through higher house prices.”).
5. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
6. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
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property.7 The Supreme Court held that a nexus must exist between a
legitimate state interest and the exaction imposed on the development8
and that this requirement was not met because the state had an interest in
preserving public ability to see the beach behind the Nollan’s proposed
dwelling but the Coastal Commission had asked for lateral beachfront
property which would not serve this purpose.9
Dolan was about a lady who wanted to expand the size of her store.
The City of Tigard conditioned her expansion upon dedication of some
of her surrounding land. The Court felt that the City wanted to exact an
inappropriate amount of property to serve the state interests of flooding
prevention and traffic congestion reduction10 and that “the city ha[d] not
attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part
of its request.”11 Thus, Dolan held that an exaction must be roughly
proportional to the impact a development creates12 and that a “city must
make some sort of individualized determination” when determining
rough proportionality.13
Statutory exactions laws in Utah compare favorably to those of other
states’ and the overall state of Utah exactions law has improved
significantly since the enactment of the first Utah statute regarding
exactions. In other words, current Utah exactions statutes better specify
the law, better reference language from the Nollan and Dolan decisions,
and better promote resolution of major concerns in exactions law. This
article specifically discusses three statutes that govern Utah exactions
law, the most recent being the Utah State Legislature’s addition of the
exactions sections in 2005 to the Municipal and County Land Use Acts.14
The other two statutes are the Utah Private Property Protection Act15 and
the Utah Impact Fees Act.16
Despite the improvements in Utah statutory exactions law, the
statutory law should be amended. The Utah Legislature should enact
statutory provisions requiring the local government to make an
individualized determination that considers certain factors or provides
appropriate evidence to justify the proportionality of any of its exactions.
Enacting such provisions would satisfy the full requirements of both
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 386, 391.
Id. at 391.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-508 (2006); § 17-27a-507.
§§ 63-90-1–4; §§ 63-90a-1–4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34a-4(1) (1993).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 11-36-101–501 (2006).
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Nollan and Dolan by incorporating their holdings into statutory law with
guidelines on how local jurisdictions can comply with the rough
proportionality aspect of Dolan.
Other sections of this article support the above paragraphs as
follows: Section II discusses general advantages of having land use
decisions made at the state rather than the local level, including specific
advantages of statutory exactions law Section III examines what Utah
has done to regulate exactions through statutory means. It analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of each of the three Utah statutes mentioned
above, including to what extent the statute references the Nollan and
Dolan tests and how well the statute promotes resolution of the existing
concerns in exactions law because of the particular statute’s clarity.
Section IV compares Utah’s statutory exactions law to other states’
statutory exactions law. Section V analyzes the effectiveness of exactions
legislation in Utah. Section VI suggests how exactions law in Utah can
be improved. Section VII concludes and summarizes the arguments
discussed throughout the paper.
II. IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS TO REGULATE LAND USE ISSUES AT THE
STATE LEVEL AND ESPECIALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO CONTROL
EXACTIONS LAW THROUGH STATE STATUTE
Regulating land use issues at the state rather than the local level
creates considerable advantages. The first advantage is that generally
officials at the state level, compared to elected or appointed officials at
lower levels of government, have more expertise and training in creating
law. The second advantage is that state officials can create law that
provides a uniform and consistent standard among lower level
jurisdictions. This may benefit developers, or even single landowners
who move over time, because these individuals can deal with an issue
under one standard even if they confront different jurisdictions. The third
advantage is that through elected representatives in the state legislature,
“the people,” rather than the judiciary, decide the law. If decisions in
exactions law are left to the local government, litigation often ensues
(according to current trends), which is why the judiciary would be
deciding the law. The last advantage is that a proactive statutory
approach helps make the law more predictable for anyone in the state
involved in exactions. A statute is an attempt to clarify things beforehand
while courts establish law by reacting to existing problems on a case-bycase basis.
Additionally, a state statutory standard is the best way to regulate
exactions law because it helps resolve two major problems existing in
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land use exactions law. First, it is questionable whether local
governments comply with or even understand existing exactions law,
resulting in arbitrary decisions.17 A more specific statutory provision
providing factors for determining whether the full Dolan test is met for
land dedication exactions and ideally other exactions as well is needed to
help local government understand the law and avoid arbitrary decisions.
Because what is not spelled out in a statute leaves room for local
discretion whereas a state impact fee statute (one type of exactions law)
can “direct local governments toward the development of a
constitutionally sound impact fee ordinance[,]”18 a state statute can help
local governments to comply with the current law of exactions by
spelling out a standard that conforms to holdings of the Supreme Court
and other authoritative courts.
The second problem in land use exactions law is that exactions are
very litigious in nature.19 “Exactions law is one of the most litigious
areas of land use law today.”20 Because “statutes often impose rigid
procedural and substantive requirements that a local government must
fulfill to make use of impact fees or . . . other exactions,”21 legislative
boundaries can prevent local challenges to exaction ordinances.22
More clarity at the local level is an alternative way to enhance
compliance with and prevent challenges to exactions law, but it is not a
good idea. As mentioned above, the current state of exactions regulation
leaves what is not spelled out statutorily to local discretion, resulting in
arbitrary decisions and litigation. If instead more is done at the state
level, this higher authority can see that the local bodies know about and
follow the Nollan and Dolan tests, which may reduce exactions
litigation.
Overall, a state statute can resolve these existing problems in
exactions law by outlining clear requirements. Such a statute can
increase understanding of the law, can direct local government to comply
with the law, thereby avoiding arbitrary decisions, and can help prevent
future challenges or litigation concerning local exactions.

17. See Schultz 884 P.2d 569, 572–73 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
18. Michael G. Sterthous, Accommodating Growth and Development after Guilderland: Is
the New York Legislature about to (Re)Act on Impact Fees?, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 227
(1990).
19. 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79D.04[7], 79D-170 (Michael
Allen Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 2000).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 79D-169.
22. See Sterthous, supra note 18 at 227 (“To eliminate ultra vires challenges to local impact
fee ordinances, the enabling statute should include certain provisions describing the extent of
authority delegated.”).
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III. THREE ACTS REGULATE EXACTIONS LAW IN UTAH
This section highlights the three Utah statutory provisions that deal
with exactions law, in order of their enactment. Under each Act in this
section, there are two parts. The first part provides a descriptive
overview of the act’s substance. The second part comprises an analysis
of the act’s strengths and weaknesses. This analysis includes how well
the act incorporates principles from Nollan and Dolan and whether the
act helps resolve the major concerns of exactions law.
A. The Utah Private Property Protection Act
1. The Utah Private Property Protection Act protects property owners
by requiring the state agency to conduct a detailed assessment.
The Private Property Protection Act deals with takings issues that
may arise under a state agency or local government23 The definition of
“taking” under the statute specifically includes “required dedications or
exactions from owners of private property.”24 The first part of the Act
was adopted in 1993.25 It requires a state agency to conduct an
assessment to help determine whether a state action constitutes a
taking.26 Then, the agency must send the report to the governor as well as
the Legislative Management Committee before any “government action”
(proposed rules and emergency rules by a state agency that if adopted
and enforced may limit the use of private property) can be taken.27 The
second part of the Act, which governs local government, was enacted in
1994.28 It constitutes section 63-90a-1 through 4 and is also known as the
Constitutional Takings Issue Legislation.29 This part of the statute directs
a political subdivision, defined as a “county, municipality, special
district, school district, or other local government entity”30 to evaluate an
action under their local takings guidelines to determine whether a taking

23. John Martinez, A Framework for Addressing Takings Problems, UTAH B. J. 13, 17
(June/July 1996).
24. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34a-2(2)(a)(iii) (1993). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90a-1(1)
(2006) (defining taking issues as “actions involving the physical taking or exaction of private real
property by a political subdivision”).
25. Martinez, supra note 23, at 17.
26. Id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90-4(1) (2006).
27. Martinez, supra note 23, at 17.
28. Id.
29. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90a-1–4 (2006); David A. Thomas, The Illusory Restraints and
Empty Promises of New Property Protection Laws, 28 URB. LAW. 223, 230 (1996).
30. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90a-1(2) (2006).
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occurs.31
2. The strengths of the Utah Private Property Protection Act lie in its
imposition of specific guidelines upon the state and its language
reference to Nollan and Dolan but it is weak because it contains limited
direction for local government.
The strengths of the Private Property Protection Act are its specific
guidelines imposed on the state government and its indirect references to
language from Nollan and Dolan in regard to state action. The statute
requires the state government agency to consider three things as part of
its assessment: the likelihood of its action being a taking, alternative
actions, and the estimated cost and source of money to compensate a
property owner in the event its action is deemed a taking.32 The statute
references the important Supreme Court exaction language by providing
that when a person is required to obtain a permit by a state agency, “any
conditions imposed on issuing the permit shall directly relate to the
purpose for which the permit is issued,”33 (remember that Nollan requires
a nexus between a state interest and the exaction) and “[a]ny restriction
imposed on the use of private property shall be proportionate to the
extent the use contributes to the overall problem that the restriction is to
redress.”34 (This is similar to Dolan’s rough proportionality requirement
that compares the impact of a development to the exaction imposed on
the developer). Both of these statements recall the familiar tests found in
Nollan and Dolan, but contain even stricter language. Rather than merely
a nexus, the statute requires a direct relationship, and rather than rough
proportionality, a restriction must be proportionate.
The Act is weak, however, because its direction to the local political
subdivisions is limited. The statute merely asks the local government to
look at its locally established guidelines to help determine when an
exaction becomes a taking.35 It further states that the “guidelines adopted
under the authority of [the statute] are advisory,” and “[a] court may not
impose liability upon [the jurisdiction] for failure to comply with the
guidelines.”36 These guidelines, then, hold little or no weight because
they are advisory and a court cannot enforce them. Finally, although an
owner may appeal an exaction decision, if the local body fails to hear the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Martinez, supra note 23, at 17.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34a-4(1) (1993).
§ 78-34a-4(2)(a) (emphasis added).
§ 78-34a-4(2)(b)(emphasis added).
Martinez, supra note 23, at 17.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90a-3(3)(a)–(b) (2006).
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appeal, then the exaction or taking is automatically deemed valid!37 In
other words, the local body could choose not to consider the issue, which
ultimately resolves the issue in their own favor. The lack of guidelines
and the weak statutory requirements that are imposed on the local bodies
diminish the statute’s ability to prevent litigation and to help local bodies
comply with the law.
Although the statute includes the Nollan and Dolan standards, its
application of these standards is limited. The “nexus” idea is referenced
only in relation to a permit granted by the state,38 which excludes impact
or other fee exactions. The proportionality standard is also limited, since
it only pertains to state restrictions on the use of private property.39 In
addition, the statute provides no requirement that a local body make an
individualized determination about rough proportionality or guidance on
how a public entity could justify the proportionality of its exaction.
Other weaknesses of the statute are seen when comparing the
requirements imposed on the state but not the local government. In
contrast to the state’s required assessment, the statute does not require
that the local government’s evaluation be subject to review by any other
authority.40 In addition, the specific considerations that must be included
in the state assessment (cost, alternatives, etc) are not required of local
governments.41 In essence, the Act only provides suggestions, not
concrete directives, to the lower levels of government.
Overall, the Private Property Protection Act does an excellent job of
regulating the state government, but it is weak in imposing requirements
upon the local level in exactions issues. The following sections of this
article will discuss how some of the problems with the Private Property
Protection Act have been resolved in the subsequent Utah statutes
pertaining to exactions. For example, guidance on how a city can justify
the proportionality of an exaction, specifically an impact fee exaction, is
provided in the Utah Impact Fees Act.42

37. §§ 63-90a-4(2)(a)(i)–(iii).
38. § 63-90-4(2)(a).
39. § 63-90-4 (2)(d)(3).
40. Martinez, supra note 23, at 17.
41. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-4(1)(b)(i)–(iii) (2006) with § 63-90a-3 (showing
that the local government does not have a similar requirement).
42. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-36-201(5)(b) (2006).
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B. The Utah Impact Fees Act
1. The Utah Impact Fees Act provides specific requirements upon
entities in the imposition and handling of impact fee exactions
In 1995, the state of Utah adopted statutory law specific to one area
of exactions—impact fee exactions.43 Known as the Utah Impact Fees
Act, the new legislation added a substantial body of law to Utah land use
exactions.44 Previous exactions law only existed in a few provisions of
the Utah Private Property Protection Act.45 The Utah Impact Fees Act,
Utah Code Annotated §§ 11-36-101 to -501, consists of five sections. It
deals with impact fee imposition, calculation, challenges, and more, with
specific requirements in each section.
2. The strength of the Utah Impact Fees Act lies in its detail, its
incorporation of the Dolan and Nollan standards, and its specific factors
cities must consider when applying the Dolan proportionality standard;
however, it deals exclusively with impact fee exactions
The strong points of the Utah Impact Fees Act are its specificity and
its recognition of the Nollan and Dolan requirements. For example, in
imposing a fee, a municipality must first prepare a detailed analysis that:
(i) identifies the impact on system improvements required by the
development activity;
(ii) demonstrates how those impacts on system improvements are
reasonably related to the development activity;
(iii) estimates the proportionate share of the costs of impacts on system
improvements that are reasonably related to the new development
activity; and
(iv) based upon those factors and the requirements of this chapter,
identifies how the impact fee was calculated. 46

The Act also provides specific factors a local entity must consider in
determining whether an impact fee is proportionate to the burdens
imposed by a new development. These include:

43.
44.
45.
46.

§§ 11-36-101–501.
§§ 11-36-101–501.
§§ 63-90-1–4; 63-90a-1–4 (2006).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-36-201(5)(a)(i)–(iv) (2006).
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(i) the cost of existing public facilities;
(ii) the manner of financing existing public facilities, such as user
charges, special assessments, bonded indebtedness, general taxes, or
federal
grants;
(iii) the relative extent to which the newly developed properties and the
other properties in the municipality have already contributed to the cost
of existing public facilities, by such means as user charges, special
assessments, or payment from the proceeds of general taxes;
(iv) the relative extent to which the newly developed properties and the
other properties in the municipality will contribute to the cost of
existing public facilities in the future;
(v) the extent to which the newly developed properties are entitled to a
credit because the municipality is requiring their developers or owners,
by contractual arrangement or otherwise, to provide common facilities,
inside or outside the proposed development, that have been provided by
the municipality and financed through general taxation or other means,
apart from user charges, in other parts of the municipality;
(vi) extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly developed
properties; and
(vii) the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts
paid at different times. 47

As shown above, the statute recognizes Nollan and Dolan. It requires a
detailed analysis by the city (remember that Dolan requires an
individualized determination by the city), a demonstration that the impact
on city systems are reasonably related to a development (similar to the
nexus requirement of Nollan), and that the costs of an impact fee be
proportionate to the impact a development creates (similar to Dolan,
although even stricter since this statute mandates proportionality and not
simply rough proportionate value).
Two other things make this Act effective. One, the Act includes
guidance on how a local entity can justify the proportionality of an
impact fee exaction.48 The factors listed above show the specificity of the
Act and reference important language from Supreme Court cases. The
real strength of these factors, however, lies in helping a local body
determine, when conducting its detailed analysis, whether an impact fee
is proportionate to the burdens imposed by development. These factors
help a city comply with Dolan’s individualized determination
requirement. The other strength of the Utah Impact Fees Act follows the

47. § 11-36-201(5)(b)(i)–(vii).
48. § 11-36-201(5)(b)(i)–(vii).
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list of factors in the statute.49 It states that “[e]ach local political
subdivision that prepares a written analysis under this Subsection on or
after July 1, 2000 shall also prepare a written summary of the written
analysis, designed to be understood by a lay person.”50 Now the statute
helps ensure that people will know the meaning of the local entity’s
analysis. Making it understandable can especially benefit single
landowners, who unlike large developers, may be dealing with an
exactions issue for the first time.
The weakness of the Utah Impact Fees Act is that it deals exclusively
with impact fee exactions. The only other type of exaction ever
mentioned in the Act is land dedication exactions, which appears only in
a sentence stating that a municipality may grant “a credit against impact
fees” to developers “for any dedication of land.”51 Thus, this Act’s
strengths, its specificity and recognition of the Nollan and Dolan
requirements, are inapplicable to other types of exactions.
C. The New Exactions Sections of the Utah Municipal and County Land
Use, Development, and Management Acts
1. The most recent Utah exactions legislation requires local bodies to
apply the nexus and rough proportionality tests from Nollan and Dolan
In 2005, the Utah Legislature added exactions sections to the already
existing Municipal and County Land Use Acts. Utah Code Annotated §
10-9a-508 and § 17-27a-507, both titled “Exactions,”52 deal with all
types of land use exactions.53 The two statutory provisions are identical
except that that the first applies to municipalities and the second to
counties. They state that a municipality or county may impose an
exaction or exactions on development proposed in a land use application
provided that “(1) an essential link exists between a legitimate
governmental interest and each exaction; and (2) each exaction is
roughly proportionate, both in nature and extent, to the impact of the
proposed development.”54

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

§ 11-36-201(5)(c).
§ 11-36-201(5)(c).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-36-202(3)(c) (2006).
§ 10-9a-508; § 17-27a-507.
B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 129 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Utah 2006).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-508 (2006); 17-27a-507.
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2. The strength of the new exactions sections lies in their broad
application to all types of exactions and their directives illustrative of
Nollan and Dolan, but it is weak in that it fails to impose the Dolan
“individualized determination” requirement or give local entities
direction on how to interpret rough proportionality
The new exactions sections have many advantages. One advantage is
that these sections apply to all types of land use exactions in whatever
circumstance they arise. The fact that the titles of the new sections are
simply “Exactions,” and that they are part of a Land Use Act, shows that
these sections apply to all land use exactions. The Utah Supreme Court,
in a recent exactions case, affirmed the broad applicability of the
sections.55 These new sections are an improvement over the Utah Impact
Fees Act because, unlike the Act, the new sections are universally
applicable, instead of exclusive to one area of exactions law. Provided
the two requirements in the statute are met, these sections allow a city or
county to impose an exaction. This means the sections govern exactions
that arise not only in administrative but legislative actions as well. The
Utah Supreme Court in B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County
stated this fact when they wrote, “the legislature has intervened by
codifying the policy decision to require rough proportionality treatment
of all development exactions, both those emanating from the application
of uniform land-use provisions . . . and from individual adjudicative
decisions.”56 Such sweeping clarity ends the debate in Utah that
continues today in other states: whether Nollan and Dolan apply to all
exactions or whether they only apply to non-legislative actions.57
Another advantage of these new sections is that they attempt to
codify the Nollan and Dolan language. Comparing the language from
these court decisions to that found in the statute is illustrative of their
similarity. Nollan states that:
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end

55. B.A.M. Dev. L.L.C., 129 P.3d at 1171 (“Knowing as we do that the legislature intended to
apply the rough proportionality test to all exactions.”).
56. Id. at 1167–68.
57. Id. at 1168 (“[D]ebate over [the rough proportionality test’s] application . . . continues in
jurisdictions that, unlike Utah, have not achieved resolution through statutory enactments.”); James
S. Burling, A Short History of Regulatory Takings—Where We Have Been and What Are the Hot
Issues of Today, SL012 ALI-ABA 1, 33 (Sept. 29–Oct. 1, 2005) (“What remains subject to some
debate is whether there is a distinction between exactions of land and money and whether there is a
distinction between exactions imposed as part of an adjudicatory permit process and those enacted
pursuant to a legislative process.”).
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advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When that essential
nexus is eliminated . . . adding the unrelated condition alters the
purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to
sustain the ban. . . . Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts
that purpose to something other than what it was. 58

The new sections indicate that a municipality or county “may impose an
exaction . . . if . . . an essential link exists between a legitimate
governmental interest and each exaction.”59 The new sections also use
language similar to that found in Dolan. That case says, “‘[R]ough
proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.”60 The new sections state that a municipality
or county “may impose an exaction . . . if each exaction is roughly
proportionate, both in nature and extent, to the impact of the proposed
development.”61 Using the language of the Supreme Court empowers
these new statutory sections and helps avoid misinterpretation of Nollan
and Dolan by the courts, municipalities, or other governmental entities.
This kind of clarity will also likely help ensure that the law is correctly
implemented and that future challenges or litigation are avoided.
The disadvantage to this new legislation, however, is that although
the sections introduce the rough proportionality test from Dolan, they
lack key language and give no further guidance to the local bodies about
how to interpret rough proportionality. The new sections leave out the
Dolan requirement that a city must make an individualized determination
to support the proportionality of its exaction. This is an important part of
the Supreme Court decision because it means the local body has to
shoulder the burden of showing its exaction is proper.62 The local bodies
are also left to their own discretion as to the determination of rough
proportionality. In contrast, the Utah Impact Fees Act gives specific
factors that a local entity must consider. Thus, while Utah statutory law
provides specific guidance in applying the rough proportionality test to
58. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
59. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-508 (2006); § 17-27a-507.
60. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-508 (2006); § 17-27a-507.
62. POWELL, supra note 19, at § 79D.04[3], 79D-156 (“Thus accompanying a new
substantive test “rough proportionality” was a shift in burden from the party challenging the
regulation to the government defending the conditional permitting.”); DAVIS, supra note 4, at §
85.12(c)(2), 909 (citing Miller & Starr, NEWSALERT, 5–6 (Cal. Ed. Sept. 1994)).
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impact fees, it fails to provide similar guidance in these new sections for
any other kind of exaction.
As shown in Section III above, Utah statutory law governing
exactions has improved over time. Each subsequent legislative enactment
has improvements not found in the previous statutory law. Statutory
exactions law in Utah began with a few provisions in the Utah Private
Property Protection Act. Subsequently, the Utah Impact Fees Act added
specific factors to suggest ways of satisfying the Dolan individualized
determination requirement (at least for impact fee exactions). Finally, the
“Exaction” sections in the Municipality and County Land Use Acts
codified most of the Nollan and Dolan requirements and made the tests
applicable to all types of exactions in whatever setting they arise.
IV. UTAH SHARES SIMILARITIES WITH OTHER STATES IN EXACTION
LAW, BUT STANDS OUT BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY STATE OTHER THAN
ARIZONA TO CREATE A STATUTORY PROVISION THAT CODIFIES
LANGUAGE FROM NOLLAN AND DOLAN
Some states have enacted statutes similar to the three Utah statutes
mentioned above. Many states have enacted legislation that protects
private property from government regulation,63 just as Utah did with the
Private Property Protection Act. These states include Florida, Texas,
Kansas, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Tennessee, and West Virginia.64
This section compares some of these states’ Private Property Rights Acts
(PPRAs) and other statutes to Utah’s exactions law to show the strength
of the Utah exactions legislation. In addition, this section highlights some
of the states that have enacted impact fee provisions and the one state,
Arizona, which has enacted exactions sections similar to the new Utah
sections in the Municipal and County Land Use Acts.65
Although Wyoming has statutory provisions similar to the Utah
Private Property Protection Act, it follows a very different approach
when it comes to evaluating exactions.66 Its statutory law states a purpose
similar to that of the Utah Private Property Protection Act in that it seeks
to “establish an orderly, consistent process that better enables
governmental bodies to evaluate whether . . . actions may result in a
taking of private property.”67 The statute says that such actions include

63. Ann L. Renhard Cole, Comment, State Private Property Rights Acts: The Potential for
Implicating Federal Environmental Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV 685, 685 (1998).
64. Id. at 721 n.1.
65. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.12 (2006); § 11-810.
66. WYO. STAT. ANN § 9-5-305 (2006).
67. § 9-5-305.
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exactions.68 Another provision that exhibits similarity is that which
governs permits. According to the Wyoming statute, “[i]f an agency
requires a person to obtain a permit for a specific use of private property,
conditions imposed on issuing the permit shall directly relate to the
purpose for which the permit is issued.”69 This same direct relationship
language is found in Utah’s law.70 However, the Wyoming law fulfills
the purpose of the statute through the attorney general71 and not through
state agencies or local government as in Utah. The statute indicates that
the “attorney general shall develop guidelines and a checklist . . . to assist
government agencies in the identification and evaluation of actions that
have constitutional implications that may result in a taking.”72 Perhaps
the Wyoming Act is superior to the Utah Private Property Protection Act
because, while essentially fulfilling the same function as the Utah Act, it
also allows a legal expert (the attorney general) to determine what
constitutes a taking rather than a government body which presumably
lacks the same level of understanding of legal takings issues.
The Montana and Texas Private Property Rights Acts are discussed
here in detail because they provide a good indication of “typical
language variations found among PPRAs.”73 Like Utah, the Acts in
Montana and Texas require the government to conduct a takings impact
assessment.74 Unlike Utah but similar to Wyoming, these two states
require the attorney general to establish the guidelines upon which to
base such an assessment, rather than the state agency.75 Also different
from the Utah Act is the fact that neither the Montana nor Texas Acts
explicitly mention exactions in their taking definition. Montana “defines
an action with taking or damaging implications as a state agency ‘rule,
policy, or permit condition or denial’ regarding environmental matters
that could constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of private
property.”76 The Texas statute defines taking as:
[A]ny state or local government action that impacts ‘private real
property, in whole or in part or temporarily or permanently’ in such a
68. § 9-5-302(a)(iii)(A)(II).
69. § 9-5-304(b)(i).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90-4(2)(a) (2006). Under the Utah Private Property Protection
Act, when a person is required to obtain a permit by a state agency, “any conditions imposed on
issuing the permit shall directly relate to the purpose for which the permit is issued.” (emphasis
added)
71. WYO. STAT. ANN § 9-5-303(a) (2006).
72. § 9-5-303(a).
73. Cole, supra note 63, at 685.
74. Id. at 691.
75. Id. at 693, 697.
76. Id. at 693 (internal quotations omitted).

205]

UTAH LAND USE EXACTIONS

223

way that: (1) the United States or Texas Constitutions require that the
property owner be compensated, or (2) it infringes on a property
owner’s right to the property, and (2b) it causes a twenty-five percent
market value reduction of the property. 77

The Montana and Texas Acts appear more favorable than Utah’s
because, like Wyoming, the attorney general provides taking guidelines
to the state. However, the attorneys general in Montana and Texas only
provide taking assessment guidelines and not a checklist as does the
attorney general in Wyoming. Yet, the Utah Act better governs
exactions, rather than just takings in general, because it specifically
includes landowner exactions as part of its taking definition.
Statutes in California and Puerto Rico, though not PPRA’s, also
exhibit language similar to the Utah Private Property Protection Act by
specifically referencing exactions and giving broad deference to the local
government.78 The California statute allows local government agency to
establish the amount of an exaction.79 The Utah Private Property
Protection Act does primarily the same thing because it asks the local
government to look at its locally established guidelines to determine
when a taking, which includes exactions, occurs.80 Statutory law in
Puerto Rico is also similar in that it states, “[t]he municipal governments
may adopt ordinances establishing the exactions they deem are necessary
to finance the infrastructure projects that are partially or totally the
responsibility of the municipalities.”81 Though these laws’ specific
references to exactions are positive, as discussed earlier in regards to the
Utah’s Private Property Protection, such deference to the local
government is a grave weakness because they can rule in their own favor
without automatic review by another authority.
A number of states have enacted either impact fee statutes, as Utah
has done, or impact fee provisions. States that have enacted statutes
include: Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.82 The New Hampshire
statute specifies certain factors the government should consider when
assessing the amount of an exaction.83 Specifically, the government must

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 696.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66411.5 (Deering 2006); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 21 § 1095j (2004).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66411.5 (Deering 2006).
Martinez, supra note 23, at 17.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 1095j (2004).
POWELL, supra note 19, at § 79D.04[4][b], 79D-160 n.48.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (2006).
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determine the “proportional share of municipal improvement costs not
previously assessed against other developments, which is necessitated by
the development, and which is reasonably related to the benefits accruing
to the development from the improvements financed by the exaction.”84
In contrast, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a provision specifying
how to calculate impact fees for transportation capital improvement
programs. Impact fees are found by dividing the “total costs of all road
improvements [in the area] by the total costs of all road improvements
[in a specific area].”85 The Utah statute is like the New Hampshire statute
because it uses a factor-based analysis rather than a specific calculation
to determine the exaction amount due. Factors-based analysis may be
better because it is more flexible; however, explicit equations provide a
local entity with more clarity.
Arizona shows great strides in exactions legislation comparable to
Utah. It is the only other state that has enacted statutory provisions
similar to Utah’s newest exactions sections. The specific language of the
Arizona statute (the city and county provisions are nearly identical)
states:
In all proceedings under this section the county [agency or official of
the city or town] has the burden to establish that there is an essential
nexus between the dedication or exaction and a legitimate
governmental interest and that the proposed dedication, exaction or
zoning regulation is roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed
use, improvement or development or, in the case of a zoning regulation,
that the zoning regulation does not create a taking of property in
violation of § 11-811[/§ 500.12]. If more than a single parcel is
involved this requirement applies to the entire property.86

Like the Utah provisions, the Arizona provisions codify the nexus and
rough proportionality tests of Nollan and Dolan. In addition, they apply
to cities and towns as well as counties just as Utah’s do. Since the two
state statutory exactions provisions are so similar, the advantages and
disadvantages discussed above in regard to the new Utah sections are
equally applicable to Arizona.
Overall, although Utah’s statutory exactions law show similarities to
other states’ laws, it also differs in important respects. The Utah law uses
a flexible factor-based analysis rather than a rigid formula to calculate
impact fees and it is the only state other than Arizona to codify the
84. § 674:21 (V)(j).
85. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10503-A (2006).
86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.12 (1995); § 11-810.
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important requirements from Nollan and Dolan. However, the Utah law
could be better if it required the attorney general to establish takings
guidelines in a fashion similar to Wyoming, Montana, or Texas.
V. THE ACTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF EXACTIONS LEGISLATION IN UTAH
IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN, BUT CASE LOAD FOLLOWING ENACTMENT
OF AN ACT AND STATE COURT REFERENCES TO AN ACT PROVIDE SOME
ASSESSMENT

It is difficult to know whether or how well the Utah statutes
governing land use exactions actually work to increase local compliance
or understanding of the law and to reduce litigation or challenges to local
exactions for a couple of reasons. One, cases in Utah can provide
evidence as to whether exactions litigation has decreased over time but
little Utah case law regarding exactions exists. Two, most exactions
disagreements occur as local challenges and local records are either hard
to find or exactions challenges may not even be reported. This section
analyzes the effectiveness of the exactions statutory law in Utah based on
two factors that should provide some external evidence: whether the
existing case load that deals with land use exactions has decreased since
the statute was enacted and how state courts reference the statutory law
in land use exaction cases.
A. The Effectiveness of the Utah Private Property Protection Act is
Unclear
It is difficult to ascertain whether the case load dealing with
exactions law in Utah has decreased as a result of the Private Property
Protection Act. The same is true when analyzing whether Utah state
courts adhere to this statutory law in cases that follow its enactment.
Only one Utah case dealing with land use exactions predates the
enactment of the Private Property Protection Act87 and there are
essentially no subsequent cases that can be used to evaluate this Act’s
effectiveness. Subsequent cases are either specific to impact fees or
follow the enactment of the other two Utah statutes dealing with
exactions as will be discussed below.

87. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
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B. The Effectiveness of the Utah Impact Fees Act is Uncertain
The comparative numbers of cases before and after the enactment of
the Utah Impact Fees Act do not show a decrease in the case load, but
that does not necessarily indicate that the Act is ineffective. Before the
Utah Impact Fees Act was enacted in 1995, there were four cases in Utah
courts about impact fees.88 Since its enactment there have also been four
cases.89 Thus, having the Act in place does not readily seem to reduce the
litigation in the courts over impact fees. Yet, it is possible that more
development occurred after the enactment of the Utah Impact Fees Act,
which would ultimately include a corresponding increase in situations
dealing with impact fees. Even stronger, challenges to impact fees at the
local level may actually have decreased since the Act, but the
comparative number of impact fee cases before and after the Act cannot
indicate that fact because local challenges do not exist in the case law
record.
The effectiveness of the Utah Impact Fees Act can be gauged by
assessing whether state courts follow or reference this statutory law
because courts that feel the statutory law is correct will cite to it. In two
cases since the Act’s enactment, the Utah Supreme Court refers to
definitions in the Utah Impact Fees Act. Both cases dealt with whether a
particular fee could be classified as an impact fee.90 In Board of
Education of Jordan School District v. Sandy City Corporation, the
Court looked at whether a storm sewer fee that the city imposed on the
Jordan School District fits the Act’s definition of an impact fee.91 The
Act defines an impact fee as, “a payment of money imposed upon
development activity as a condition of development approval.”92 The
Court held that the sewer fee was not an impact fee because the fee was
not imposed upon the school district when the schools were built.93 In
Board of Trustees of Washington County Water Conservancy District v.
Keystone Conversions, L.L.C., the Utah Supreme Court looked at
whether a water availability fee was an impact fee under the Utah Impact
88. Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of W. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992); Salt Lake County v.
Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991); Lafferty v. Payson, 642 P.2d 376
(Utah 1982); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City; 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
89. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp, 94 P.3d 234 (Utah 2004); Bd. of
Trs. of Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Keystone Conversion, L.L.C., 103 P.3d 686
(Utah 2004); Home Builders Ass’n v. City of N. Logan, 983 P.2d 561 (Utah 1999); Home Builders
Ass’n of Utah v. City of Am. Fork, 973 P.2d 425 (Utah 1999).
90. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist., 94 P.3d at 234; Bd. of Trs. of Washington County
Water Conservancy Dist., 103 P.3d at 686.
91. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist., 94 P.3d at 234.
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-36-102(7)(a) (2006).
93. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist., 94 P.3d at 240–41.

205]

UTAH LAND USE EXACTIONS

227

Fees Act definition.94 The Court expanded the definition to include
authorization “when [development activities] create demand and need for
public facilities.”95 The Court then held that the water fee was not an
impact fee since the developer’s construction did not create a greater
need for such facilities.96 Both of these cases demonstrate that the Utah
Supreme Court is following the Utah Impact Fees Act because it is
applying the definitions found therein, which implies that the Court feels
the statutory law is good law. Lower state courts will likely follow the
Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation.
In one case decided subsequent to the enactment of the Utah Impact
Fees Act, the Act is not recognized.97 Home Builders Association of Utah
v. City of American Fork was a case involving a developer’s challenge to
the City’s imposition of various impact fees.98 The Utah Supreme Court
decided the case in 1999, four years after the enactment of the Utah
Impact Fees Act, without making reference to the Act.99 It is possible
that the case may have begun before the Act was enacted or that the
plaintiffs failed to raise an argument dealing with the statute. The Court
only mentions law from a 1981 case Banberry Development Corporation
v. South Jordan City,100 which established factors to help assess the
reasonableness of an impact fee on a development, although the factors
were actually incorporated as part of the Utah Impact Fees Act.101 The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of district court and decided
that summary judgment for the developers was unwarranted although the
Mayor and City Council members in Home Builders did not consider the
Banberry factors when it imposed the impact fees.102 The Court held that
the City officials did not need to personally investigate fee
reasonableness because they were entitled to rely on members of the city
staff.103 Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court was wrong to
presume that “the seven factors suggested in Banberry constitute a
mandatory test of some sort for the creation of a valid fee,”104 and instead
wrote that the factors were merely “an illustrative list of factors that

94. Bd. of Trs. of Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Keystone Conversion,
L.L.C., 103 P.3d 686, 686 (Utah 2004).
95. Id. at 693.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Home Builders Ass’n of Utah v. City of Am. Fork, 973 P.2d 425 (Utah 1999).
99. Id.
100. Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
101. David Nuffer, Utah’s 1995 Impact Fee Legislation, UTAH B. J. 12, 14 (Aug./Sept. 1995).
102. Home Builders Ass’n of Utah, 973 P.2d at 427, 430.
103. Home Builders Ass’n of Utah v. City of Am. Fork, 973 P.2d 425, 431 (Utah 1999).
104. Id. at 430.
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municipalities should consider.”105 It seems that the court wrongly
decided this point of law if the case was decided under the Utah Impact
Fees Act, because the statute states that when “analyzing whether or
not . . . the costs of public facilities (and the impact fees included fees for
such facilities) are reasonably related to the new development activity,
the local body shall identify . . .” and then the statute lists the seven
factors.106 This illustrates that the Utah Impact Fees Act was not yet in
place or else the Act is not very effective because the Utah Supreme
Court failed to follow or reference the statutory law. Exactly why the
Court failed to recognize the existing statutory law in this case is
unknown.
Home Builders Association v. City of North Logan107 is another case
that the Utah Supreme Court decided subsequent to the enactment of the
Utah Impact Fees Act. It deals with and has essentially the same issue
and holding as Home Builders Association of Utah v. City of American
Fork.108 Again, the Utah Supreme Court refers to Banberry and how its
factors are more like suggestions than requirements.109 Yet, this case was
filed in 1994110, which may explain why no reference is made to the Utah
Impact Fees Act.
In summary, the amount of cases dealing with impact fees has not
decreased since the statute was enacted and some Utah cases subsequent
to the enactment of the Utah Impact Fees Act reference the Act while
others do not. For the reasons mentioned in this subsection, both of these
indicators may not provide a very reliable showing of this Act’s
effectiveness. A longer period of time in which to assess the impact of
the Utah Impact Fees Act is necessary to fully evaluate the Act’s
effectiveness.
C. The “Exactions” Sections of the Municipal and County Land Use
Acts seem effective
The actual effectiveness of the new provisions in the County and
Municipal Land Use Acts are somewhat difficult to ascertain because
they have been in effect for less than a year.111 Thus, whether the case
load has decreased since the statutes went into effect is not a question
105. Id.
106. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-36-201(5)(b) (2006).
107. Home Builders Ass’n v. City of N. Logan, 983 P.2d 561 (Utah 1999).
108. Id. at 562–564.
109. Id. at 564.
110. Id. at 562.
111. The new sections had only been in effect for a year at the time this article was being
prepared for publication.
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that can yet be answered. But since the new sections’ enactment in May
of 2005, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the County exactions
section in one case.112 In B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake
County113, the Court found that although the statute could not be applied
retroactively in this case, the statute provided guidance on how the state
would have likely held in regard to county exactions a few years ago.114
The court stated that,
Knowing as we do that the legislature intended to apply the rough
proportionality test to all exactions . . . we are hard pressed to find a
reason to assume that the legislative view of the proper scope of the
rough proportionality test would have been different before section 1727a-507 went into effect. 115

This case provides proof that the legislative enactment holds great
weight. Moreover, because the Utah Supreme Court commented highly
on the provision, other Utah courts should uphold this statutory law in
subsequent exaction cases. Finally, B.A.M. also shows that the Court, and
Utah, may even apply its principles retroactively.
VI. MEANS OF IMPROVING STATUTORY EXACTIONS LAW IN UTAH:
REQUIRING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AN INDIVIDUALIZED
DETERMINATION THAT JUSTIFIES THE PROPORTIONALITY OF
EXACTIONS, MANDATING A CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN FACTORS,
AND PROVIDING APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE OR A SET FORMULA.
The new exactions sections in the Municipal and County Land Use
Acts would better encompass the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on
exactions law if they explicitly stated outright that a political subdivision
must make an individualized determination to support the proportionality
of its exaction. The Supreme Court rule from Dolan states that the local
body must make an individualized determination regarding exaction
proportionality.116 It is then reasonable that the Utah statute should also
include this important part of the Court’s decision. According to legal
scholars, “[a] critically important aspect of the Dolan decision is the . . .
placement of the burden on the public entity to justify its exactions.”117

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 129 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2006).
Id.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
DAVIS, supra note 4, at 909 (citing Miller & Starr, NEWSALERT, 5–6 (Cal. Ed. Sept.
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The Utah legislature could also improve the new exactions sections
if they required the local entity to consider certain factors or provide
specific evidence in making its determination about exaction
proportionality. Legal scholars have indicated that “[w]hile it is not
entirely clear from the majority opinion, as a practical matter, the
[Dolan] Court’s decision probably means that cities . . . will have to
make findings . . . that show a reasonably close fit between the particular
development’s projected impacts and any exactions or conditions
required.”118 If the new exaction provisions contained language imposing
mandatory consideration of certain factors, they would provide clear
guidelines on how to satisfy Dolan’s rough proportionality requirement
as to any kind of land use exaction. The Utah legislature could do so by
using some or all of the factors already found in the Utah Impact Fees
Act. As described earlier in this article, this Act mandates that a political
subdivision consider seven factors when determining whether an impact
fee is proportionate to the burdens imposed by a new development.119 In
addition, or instead, the legislature could ask a local entity to support a
finding of proportionality through providing appropriate evidence. One
legal scholar suggested the use of traffic surveys, engineering studies,
and expert testimony as evidence.120
If nothing else, the new statutory provisions should include some
kind of considerations or factors to determine if the rough proportionality
test is satisfied for land dedication exactions, since the Dolan standard
originated in this context.121 It is somewhat surprising that a Utah statute
specified factors to consider in the application of the Dolan rough
proportionality test as to impact fees before a Utah statute was even
enacted that explicitly applied the rough proportionality test to land
dedication exactions. It is surprising not only because the rough
proportionality test originated from a decision involving land dedication
and not impact fees, but also because land dedications are so
commonplace.122 The lack of factors applicable to exactions other than
an impact fee may be the result of these new sections being enacted ten
years later than the Utah Impact Fees Act. Perhaps the Utah Legislature
has just not yet broadened the scope of the new statutory provisions. Or,
perhaps land dedication exactions have been less litigious than impact
1994)).
118. Id. at 910.
119. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 11-36-201(5)(b)(i)–(vii) (2006).
120. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 910.
121. Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
122. POWELL, supra note 19, at § 79D.04[2][b], 79D-152 (“[I]t is not unusual to require a
developer to dedicate land or to construct such on-site improvements as streets, sidewalks, or utility
easements.”).
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fee exactions, or have seemed less important to those pushing for
exactions legislation. Whatever the reason is, a more specific statutory
provision providing factors for determining whether the full Dolan test is
met for land dedication exactions is needed to avoid arbitrary decisions
by local governments. Such a provision would require greater showing
by the local entity to justify its land dedication exaction, thus providing
more assurance to a landowner that a fair trade, the giving of land in
exchange for new development, had occurred.
Critics of the individualized determination requirement of the Dolan
decision argue that shifting “the burden of proof to the municipality . . .
could make land-use decisions more expensive and more timeconsuming.”123 Even if this is true, their concern can be assuaged while
still requiring that the local authority make a determination. Expense to
the local entity could be reduced by passing the cost on to developers.
The local entity could “commission ‘property right impact statements,’
much like developers now pay for environmental impact statements.”124
The amount of research local bodies might engage in to justify an
exaction could be decreased if specific factors were spelled out in the
exactions sections of the Utah statute. This way, local bodies could focus
their finding efforts on meeting just those factors.
One scholar suggests that a set formula is the best way to regulate
exactions.125 He states that “fees and other exactions based on a formula
are the most likely to withstand the scrutiny of courts today.”126 He also
indicates that dedications without a formula may violate the rough
proportionality test.127 A different legal scholar indicates that land
dedications could be exacted based on “a fixed percentage of the total
amount of land in the subdivision—varying from [three percent] to
[fifteen percent] or more.”128 Or, a developer could be required to pay an
in-lieu of land fee based on the “[(1)] fair market value of the land or a
percentage . . . at a specific point in time; (2) a fixed dollar amount per
lot or dwelling unit; or (3) a variable amount of the fair market value
based on the density of the subdivision.”129 Impact fees could be assessed
by imposing a set fee for each unit of development or using a
mathematical formula that accounts for things necessary to build a
facility.130 For example, a road impact fee calculation could consider the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

DAVIS, supra note 4, at 910.
Id.
POWELL, supra note 19, at § 79D.04[2][b], 79D-152.
Id.
Id. § 79D-151.
DAVID A. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 256 (4th ed. 2004).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 273.
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number of new travel miles per day the development imposed, the new
lane miles, construction cost, right of way cost, etc.131 These are all
potential ways the state could use a formula in imposing exactions.
Although Dolan specifically stated that “no precise mathematical
calculation is required” to determine the proportionality of an exaction,132
maybe more clarity would better avoid litigation and prevent local
governmental abuses.
A higher statutory standard that incorporates mandatory factors,
evidentiary considerations, or a set formula along with an individualized
determination requirement in the new exactions sections is necessary for
many reasons. Such requirements could stop local areas from abusing
their power and thereby reduce challenges or litigation to exactions.133 It
would also be easier for political subdivisions to apply correct law if
ways to satisfy proportionality are laid out for them in the statute. For a
single landowner who probably will not or cannot afford to bring suit
against a local entity, unlike some developers, a clear provision that
curbs municipal abuse is especially helpful. Clarity may also benefit
taxpayers. Cities could also save community resources that would
otherwise be used in exaction litigation. A decrease in litigation would
also save valuable judicial resources. For many reasons, it is best to try to
resolve exactions more proactively, rather than reactively.
VII. CONCLUSION
Utah statutes governing exactions law started out very general and
became more specific over time. Each subsequent legislative enactment
has improvements not found in the previous statutory law. Statutory
exactions law in Utah started in 1993 with the Utah Private Property
Protection Act. The Act defines what constitutes a taking, including in its
definition invalid exactions. It is very specific about how a state agency
should address a potential takings issue, but fails to provide specific
guidance to local bodies. Next, the Utah Impact Fees Act was enacted in
1995. It tells political subdivisions they must consider specific factors to
satisfy the Dolan proportionality requirement in regard to impact fees.
Finally, the addition of the “Exactions” sections to the Municipal and
County Land Use Acts codified much of the Nollan and Dolan
131. Id. at 273–74.
132. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
133. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 128, at 254 (“Municipalities that rely on after-the-fact
findings to support exactions . . . may face costly litigation. Moreover, because ad hoc exactions are
immediately suspect under the remoteness standard, [the Nollan test] developers may be more
willing to challenge them. The better plan is for a community to devise standards, supported by
studies, to guide its imposition of exactions.”).
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requirements and made them applicable to all kinds of exactions in
whatever setting they arise. It is yet to be seen if the statutes are effective
in Utah, but Utah’s law compares favorably to other states’ exactions
law. Increased specificity of statutory law likely helps reduce litigation
and helps local governments comply with the law. For these reasons, and
to be sure that the full requirements of Dolan are met, the Utah
legislature should add to the new exactions sections language requiring
local entities to make individualized exaction determinations and include
in those determinations justification of an exaction’s rough
proportionality to the impact created by a new development. The
enhanced statutory law could mandate that a local entity use factors,
perhaps analogous to those found in the Utah Impact Fees legislation,
expert evidence, formulas, or all three, to support a finding of rough
proportionality.
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